Thursday, March 26, 2015

PST rejects mobile surveillance – such answers spy hunters – Aftenposten

For the first time since last December talked PST today about Aftenposten measurements showed that with high probability was advanced monitoring equipment for mobile phones in Oslo in December .

– Our conclusion is that it is not found indications of the use of false base stations or IMSI-catchers in the raw material which Aftenposten has based their articles, and they measurements Aftenposten has done in collaboration with several security companies, said PST boss at a press conference this afternoon.

PST mean everything has a natural explanation and believed there were several weaknesses of the studies.

The companies that have assisted Aftenposten, reacted strongly.

– We are strongly disagreed PST assessment. We stand in for any conclusions in our reports, which Aftenposten has rendered in a timely manner, says Jan-Helge Flesvik, CEO of the Norwegian security company Aeger Group.



PST ratings

Below are PST ratings Aftenpostens basis material, and how security companies responding:

1) Do not know enough about the normal screen

PST mean security companies have not had enough knowledge to know what is “normal image of the mobile networks” in Oslo.

According to PST is “man entirely dependent on identifying what is normal picture.”

“To form a correct normal image must be obtained necessary information from telecommunications providers. These include information that is not publicly available. “Writes PST.

– PST has used a method where you first create a” reference image “of the entire mobile network in an area, and then looking at deviations. It is not very effective, and it is therefore the method is partly outdated. Our equipment looks at how the base station behaves. Then you see quickly that a fake base station has a completely different type of activity than a normal base station, said Kyrre Sletsjøe in Cepia Technologies.



2) Measurements over short time

PST writes that “the measurements should be performed over a longer period, so as to be better able to understand what is natural signals.”

“It emerges also that many of the measurements are done in motion and that the analysis afterwards have not taken into account the difference between the measurements performed in motion and measurements performed at rest, “writes PST.

– It seems that PST has spent simple base station scanners, which are easy to obtain and provide extremely much data. It might explain why they have spent over three months to draw a conclusion. There are several types newer and more advanced equipment that makes you do not need many seconds to look at the behavior of a base station, answering Sletsjøe.



3) Discovery of cells with equal cell ID

PST believes Aftenposten misunderstand two different cells with equal cell ID, and interprets them to be false base stations.

” In both cases this is part of normal image when both Netcom and Telenor have cells with equal cell ID within the same area. There is nothing suspicious about this, “writes PST.

– This almost seems like an attempt to create a deliberate misunderstanding, says Sletsjøe.

– There are absolutely correct that NetCom and Telenor have two cells with equal cell ID in this area, but they have different provider numbers. We know where Telenor cell stands, and it differs greatly from where we mirror signals, says Flesvik.



4) Error Interpreters reseleksjonsverdiene

In order to utilize the capacity of mobile networks using telecommunication companies a process called reseleksjon, which controls traffic to different cells and frequencies.

According to PST is “reseleksjonsverdiene a number of times is interpreted errors in Aftenposten source material (…) Treasury measurements and information from telecommunications providers shows that the values ​​contained in the base material is normal. “

– Reseleksjonsverdier in itself provides very little insight into what the base does. Again, this shows that the PST method is inefficient, says Sletsjøe, who believes the responses show that PST has had limited expertise in this area.

– Reputation Management

– There are the limited what you can learn in three months. E-service has not worked dedicated to discovering false base stations, because it has not been an interesting problem for them, says Sletsjøe, who has long experience of E-service.

Police Security Service has questioned both Sletsjøe and Flesvik. Flesvik says that the day today has confirmed the impression he got during interrogation.

– I’ve got an impression that PST has failed to distinguish between the investigation and their own need for reputation management, says Flesvik.

PST has not still not questioned Gordon McKay security company Delma, who operated counterintelligence equipment when Aftenposten made its findings last fall.

Professor: Fog Laying from PST

During the debate on Dagsnytt 18 NRK says University professor Josef Noll, one of the foremost independent experts, following about PST statements today:

– I consider this complete obfuscation. I would say that I can this subject. When I get information about that only concentrates on cell ID and reselsksjonsverdier, and not run a thorough investigation, I feel this was not an answer that satisfies academia. I have gone through what was presented, and personally, I feel that this was a diversion, says Noll.

Aftenposten presented findings also Noll in advance of publication in December.

– I think it’s very likely that there were false base stations in the material I got presented, says Noll Thursday night.

Published: March 26th. 2015 7:00 p.m.

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