You go along Parkveien behind the castle or past Parliament. Suddenly your mobile captured by the most likely an IMSI-catcher, a false base station.
Mobile can now be tapped and tapped for data. Without that you have no idea what is happening. Without knowing who gets the information.
For one year all debate about privacy and surveillance, both in the US and Europe, has been marked by Edward Snow Its revelations of US surveillance giant NSA ability and willingness to collect, store and analyze massive amounts of electronic communication.
This is not a Snowden-issue. But the shady world Edward Snowden gave us an insight into, a relevant backdrop for the unrest Aftenposten revelations now trigger.
Can be several operators
There is a lot we do not know. But Aftenposten has evidently mapped a web of false base stations, established by actors who are unknown to most people. It may not be one player behind. There may be more, and they do not even know about each other.
That such activities take place, is no surprise. There is scope, the specific and detailed mapping is sensational. Everything indicates a business beyond the temporary mass bugging that Norwegian police in certain situations can carry quite legal. And that professional players behind.
Thus be considerable pressure on Norwegian authorities.
Know more than they would say?
Head of EOS Committee Eldbjørg Løwer was unaware that she even has an office just a few hundred meters from the probably a fake base station. NPT expresses strong concern after they are familiar with Aftenposten material. National Security Authority (NSM) has initiated its own searches in Oslo and made suspicious findings – having been familiar with the newspaper survey.
Police Security Service (PST) points out that the technology fits in a suitcase and believes that “it has no intention to run around to find the equipment itself.”
When Aftenposten in cooperation with private security companies are practically able to provide the address of false base stations Then of course the Police Security Service (PST) also find them.
But maybe choose the police to look the other way. False base stations can be located at each end of Park Road, near US and Israeli embassy. These are countries that have sufficient resources and not least the interest of obtaining the best possible overview of movements around the embassies.
Must have implications
Aftenposten mapping must have consequences. We can hardly live with a strong suspicion that the country’s political leaders and anyone else traveling in central areas of Oslo, can get their phones tapped and tapped for data.
In its annual assessment of security challenges for Norway, E-service a separate section on threats in the digital space.
“Foreign intelligence infiltrates daily Norwegian infrastructure,” it stated. State actors cited as the biggest threat to Norwegian interests.
The objectives of these operations are mainly Norwegian civilian and military knowledge and technology. Political decisions and decision processes is mentioned specifically as a high priority target for foreign intelligence services.
When Aftenposten now reveals capacity for mobile bottling by parliament and prime minister’s office, the nerve centers of political decision-making processes, it is most natural to think in the courts E-service pulls up here.
Tighter digital threat
In this year assessment, Focus 2014, writes E service that several countries have established significant capacity to perform operations in the digital space . For the first time named two states: Russia and China.
About Russia states that “the country possesses sophisticated capabilities that are designed for effective intelligence gathering.” In the section on China becomes asserted that “Chinese actors employ large degree digital operations in its information gathering. “
Digital intelligence activities directed against Norway and Norwegian interests, has increased in scope over the past year, according to E-service. In light of it becomes PST resignation the under-priced.
* Believes PST it is impossible to detect foreign IMSI catchere?
* Will not PST go out with what they know, because players behind not oppose the perceived Norwegian interests?
* Believes PST there is reason to hunt false base stations?
The police can not just focus on prevention and awareness-raising activities in a situation of unknown intelligence installations a stones throw from the Prime Minister’s office.
Twitter:perandersmadsen
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